In the fall of 1929, the market value of all shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange fell by 30 percent. Many analysts then and now take the view that stocks were then overvalued and the stock market was in need of a correction. Irving Fisher argued that the fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued. In this paper, we estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity in 1929 using data on stocks of productive capital and tax rates as in McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) and compare it to actual stock valuations. We find that the stock market in 1929 did not crash because the market was overvalued. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that stocks were undervalued, even at their 1929 peak.
Introduction
On October 22, 1929, a headline in the New York Times read: "Fisher says prices of stocks are low." Two days later, the stock market crashed. Fisher based his projection on strong earnings reports, fewer industrial disputes, and evidence of high investment in R&D and other intangible capital. But, because the market fell dramatically, many analysts concluded that he had been wrong in his assessment that stocks were undervalued in October
1929.
There have been many attempts since to determine if the rise in stock prices prior to the crash in 1929 was in fact an inflated speculation, a "bubble." The same basic methodology has been applied, namely, to estimate deviations between market values and the present value of expected future dividends. Many find a bubble. Many do not. The results are inconclusive because it is hard to estimate market participants' expectations and the rates at which they discount the future.
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In this paper, we take a different approach to the question of whether or not stocks were overvalued. Instead of using data on dividends, we use data on productive capital stocks and tax rates to estimate the fundamental value of all U.S. corporations. By this, we mean the value of productive assets in the corporate sector. Our conservative estimate of the fundamental value of these corporations before the crash -assuming as low a value for intangible capital as observations allow -is 20 times after-tax corporate earnings, which for 1929 is 1.8 times GNP.
2
Estimates of the actual 1929 market value, which are based on samples of publicly traded stocks, are all below 19 times after-tax corporate earnings at the peak in 1929. Thus, we find that the evidence supports Fisher's view that stock prices, even at their peak, were low relative to fundamental values.
The Market Value of U.S. Corporations in 1929
We first estimate the market value of U.S. corporations at the end of August in 1929.
By this, we mean the market capitalization. Data are available for representative subsets of U.S. corporations. In this section, we use these data to produce a range of estimates for the market value of all U.S. corporations.
In our view, the most reliable estimate available is a total value of U.S. corporations of 1.54 times GNP, or 17.5 times after-tax corporate earnings. This estimate is based on a detailed study of 135 industrial corporations done by Laurence Sloan and Associates (1936) at the Standard Statistics Company, a company that later merged with Poor's Publishing to become Standard and Poor's (S&P). The estimate we will use, however, is a total value of 1.67 times GNP (or 19 times after-tax corporate earnings). This estimate is based on the price-earnings ratio of the S&P composite stock index. Because we are evaluating Fisher's claim that the stock market prior to the crash of 1929 was undervalued, we want to use a conservative (high) estimate of the actual market value of U.S. corporations in 1929.
During the Depression, Sloan (1936) conducted a detailed study of 135 leading industrial corporations. The companies in the study had complete financial histories over the 1922-1933 period and, in the authors' opinion, were representative of large companies in business during this period. The study provides detailed income accounts and balance sheets for the aggregate and specific details for major industries and major corporations.
At the peak of the stock market in late August/early September of 1929, the common stocks of the companies in Sloan's (1936) sample had a market value of $30.8 billion. For the year 1929, the net profits, after tax, available for the common stock were $1.76 billion.
If the companies in the Sloan (1936) study are truly representative of the U.S. economy, then we can use the market value and after-tax profits for these companies to get an estimate of the total value of all corporations. In particular, if we assume that the ratio of market value to after-tax profits (the "price-earnings ratio") for the 135 companies is equal to the priceearnings ratio for all companies, then an estimate for the market value of all companies is the price-earnings ratio of the 135 companies multiplied by after-tax profits for all companies.
In Figure 1 , we plot the ratio of economy-wide after-tax corporate profits to GNP.
These data are available in the Survey of Current Business National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) for 1929 and after (U.S. Commerce 1929 Commerce -2000 . Prior to 1929, we apply the methodology of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to construct our own measures of after-tax corporate profits. (See U.S. Commerce 1985 and our Data Appendix for details.)
The results are in Table 1 . In 1929, the BEA reports after-tax profits equal to 8.8 percent of GNP. Using their methodology, we estimate that while 1929 profits were high, this year was not an outlier. After-tax profits in all years from 1925 through 1929 were high by postwar standards.
If we multiply the price-earnings estimate of Sloan (1936) , which is equal to 17.5, by 1929 total NIPA earnings, we get an estimate for the market value of all corporations in late August/early September of 1929 of 1.54 times GNP (= 30.8/1.76 × 8.8).
We can use the same procedure with companies in the S&P indices. In Table 2 , we provide a list of the 50 companies in the S&P industrial index, the 20 companies in the S&P index of railroads and the 20 companies in the S&P index of public utilities. The 90 are the stocks in their composite index. Along with names, we report on the market capitalization of each company at the end of August 1929 and the net earnings for the year 1929. The market capitalization is computed with data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). Net earnings is the after-tax profits for common stockholders, which is the sum of common stock dividends plus surplus. Earnings data are compiled by Moody's Investor Services (1930) and Poor's Publishing Company (1930) .
For the 50 industrial companies in the S&P index, the ratio of the total market capitalization to net earnings is 18.4. Aggregate earnings and this price-earnings ratio imply an estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.62 times GNP. This is slightly higher than Sloan's (1936) estimate, which was based on a broader subset of industrial companies.
To compute an estimate of the total market capitalization using all 90 companies in the S&P composite index, we first construct weights on industrials, railroads, and public utilities using the entire population of companies in the CRSP database for August 1929. We find that the market capitalization of railroads (SIC 4000) in the CRSP population is 12 percent of the total. We find that the market capitalization of public utilities, including electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 4900), as well as communications (SIC 4800) and local and interurban passenger transit (SIC 4100) accounts for 17 percent of the total market capitalization of the CRSP population of companies. The remaining 71 percent is considered to be in industrials.
With weights of 45%, 23%, and 32% on industrials, railroads, and utilities, respectively, we can match aggregate market capitalizations with the S&P subsample.
If we weight market capitalizations and net earnings for the three S&P categories and then take the ratio, we have a price-earnings ratio of 19.
3 Aggregate earnings and this priceearnings ratio imply an estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.67 times GNP, which is close to that for industrials only.
We should note that an estimate of 19 for the price-earnings ratio is significantly higher Figure 2 , we plot monthly levels in billions of dollars over the [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] period. We also plot the end-of-year market value as a ratio of GNP. In August of 1929, companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange had a market value of $89.7 billion -close to the value of GNP for the year 1929, which was $104.5 billion.
In Figure 3 , we show that the market value of NYSE companies was roughly 69 percent of the total value of all domestic corporations during the entire post-World War II period. found by using a multiple of the NYSE.
In Table 3 , we summarize the findings of this section. In each row of the table, we list the source and coverage of the data, the information available -either the market values or the price-earnings ratios -and our estimate of the total market value of all U.S. companies relative to GNP. As we noted earlier, the estimate we believe to be the most reliable is Sloan's (1936) , which implies a total market value of 1.54 times GNP. But this estimate lies between the higher estimates based on S&P companies and the lower estimates of Fisher (1930) , Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) , and that based on the NYSE and Flow of Funds data.
To be conservative in assessing Fisher's thesis, we will use the estimate of 19 times earnings when we compare the actual market capitalization to our estimate of the fundamental value of the corporate sector.
The Fundamental Value of U.S. Corporations in 1929
We turn now to our estimation of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations. By this,
we mean the value of the underlying productive assets -both tangible and intangible -of the corporate sector. In this section, we construct lower bound estimates of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations in August of 1929. Each estimate is conditional on a real interest rate. In the subsequent section, we show that for all real interest rates that are not grossly inconsistent with observations, the fundamental value exceeds the market value.
As we show in McGrattan and Prescott (2001) , in an environment with stable tax policy, the market value of a corporation along a balanced growth path should be equal to
where K 0 T is the end-of-period resource cost of tangible capital, K 0 I is the end-of-period resource cost of intangible capital, τ pers is the tax rate on personal income including stock dividends, and τ corp is the tax rate on corporate profits.
In the literature concerned with stock market bubbles, the standard formula used for
V is the present discounted value of expected future stock dividends rather than (1). In theory, both can be used. The advantage of (1) is that it requires no assumptions about market participants' expectations. Instead, we need measures of marginal tax rates and the resource cost of capital.
A. Marginal Tax Rates
In Table 3 , we report marginal tax rates on corporate profits and dividends. The tax rate on profits is the ratio of the NIPA profits tax liability to the before-tax profits from Table   1 . The tax rate on dividends is a weighted average surtax rate on net income. 5 The weights used in averaging across net income classes are fractions of dividend income for each class.
Both tax rates shown in Table 3 stay roughly constant over the 1925-1929 period. The tax rate on corporate profits was on average 14.6 percent, and the tax rate on dividends was roughly 10.3 percent. The fact that they are stable over time is important for our analysis since we are computing steady state values.
B. Tangible Capital
We now estimate the fundamental value of tangible capital using data from the Survey of Current Business (U.S. Commerce 1929 Commerce -2000 and the Statistics of Income (U.S. Treasury
1913-1997).
In Figure 4 , we plot the resource cost of end-of-period tangible capital in the corporate sector, namely, K Between 1926 and 1929, the resource cost of total measured, tangible capital plus inventories was 1.27 times GNP on average. This ratio changed little until the Great Depression period. By postwar standards, 1.27 times GNP is high. But tax rates on capital were much higher in later periods. Using the average tax rates in Table 4 , we compute a fundamental value of 1.14 times GNP (= (1−.103)×1.27) for tangible capital.
We have not included land in our measure of tangible capital because data are not available on land values. For the postwar period, McGrattan and Prescott (2001) estimate land values to be around 3.3 or 3.4 percent of GNP. Because we are computing a conservative (low) estimate for capital values, we will simply ignore land for our calculations here.
We have also left out any corporate foreign capital, which is not included in BEA measures. But this capital is insignificant in 1929.
C. Intangible Capital
An estimate of intangible capital, namely, K 0 I , is needed to compute our total fundamental value, V , using (1). This is more difficult than computing the cost of tangible capital because intangible investment is not recorded by the BEA. For the purposes of this paper, we want to construct a lower bound on K 0 I . If the lower bound for our estimate of the fundamental value is larger than the upper bound of estimates of the actual market value, we will argue that Irving Fisher was right.
A relation between after-tax NIPA profits and the corporate capital stocks that we
where Π is after-tax NIPA profits, i is the real interest rate, and g is the growth rate of real output. (See McGrattan and Prescott 2000, 2001 .) Two assumptions are needed to derive (2). First, we assume that the after-tax rate of return for tangible corporate capital is equal to the rate of return for intangible corporate capital and all other types of capital. Otherwise, firms would not be operating in the interest of their owners. Second, we assume that tax policy is unchanging so that steady state analysis is appropriate.
To see why (2) holds, consider how the BEA computes NIPA corporate profits. Suppose that the true income from capital in the corporate sector is r T K T + r I K I , where r T and r I are rental rates for tangible capital and intangible capital, respectively. If we subtract depreciation allowances for tangible capital, property taxes, and any expenses like R&D that are related to intangible investment, we have the BEA measure of before-tax corporate profits. It is this income that is subject to corporate profits tax. Thus, the BEA measure of after-tax corporate profits is
where δ T is the depreciation rate of tangible capital, τ prop is the property tax rate, and
In McGrattan and Prescott (2001), we show that the real return to tangible investment is (1 − τ corp )(r T − δ T − τ prop ), while the real return to intangible investment is r I − δ I . The return on intangible investment is not affected by the corporate tax rate because intangible investment can be expensed while tangible investment must be capitalized. Equation (2) follows immediately from the fact that both of these returns are equal to i, the real interest rate.
If we divide both sides of (2) by GNP, we have a formula that we can use to estimate intangible capital given observations on after-tax corporate profits (Figure 1) , the resource cost of tangible capital (Figure 4) , and the corporate tax rate (Table 4) . This formula is given by
for some fixed ratio K I /GNP. Suppose, for example, that the growth rate of real GNP is 3.5 percent and the real interest rate is 5.6 percent. Then our estimate of intangible capital for 1929 -given observations on corporate profits, the corporate tax rate, and tangible capitalis 1 times GNP. Similarly, if the real growth rate is 3 percent and the real interest rate is 5.4 percent, then our estimate for intangible capital is again 1 times GNP.
We have observations on real GNP growth from Romer (1989 To see how the real interest rate affects the value of intangible capital and, therefore, the fundamental value of corporate capital, consider Table 5 . The fundamental value is the sum of the value of tangible capital, which is equal to 1.14, and the value of intangible capital, which varies with the real interest rate. For example, a real interest rate of 5 percent implies a ratio of intangible capital to GNP (K 0 I /GNP) equal to 2.1 times GNP. This is the resource cost of intangible capital. With a personal tax rate of 10.3 percent and a corporate tax rate of 14.6 percent, the fundamental value of intangible capital is 1.61 times GNP. If we add this to the value of tangible capital (1.14), then the estimate for the total fundamental value of corporate capital is 2.75 times GNP -much higher than the market value of 1.67 times GNP.
As is clear from Table 5 , the critical rate of interest is 6 percent. For real rates below 6 percent, the fundamental value of corporate capital is above 1.67 times GNP, and the market is undervalued. At real rates of 6 percent and above, the fundamental value is below the actual market value, and the market is overvalued.
To justify the DeLong and Shleifer (1991) and the Rappaport and White (1993) claim that the stock market was significantly overvalued in August 1929 -say, by as much as 30 percent -we would have to have the real interest rate in excess of 6.5 percent. Our theory says that for this overvaluation to be consistent with the facts on corporate profits, capital stocks, and tax rates, it must be the case that the value of intangible capital was very low by postwar standards, roughly 0.18 times GNP, and that real interest rates were very high by postwar standards, in excess of 6.5 percent. This leads us to the evidence on the real rate of interest.
The Real Rate of Interest
In this section, we determine an upper bound for the real interest rate using two methods. First, we use market interest rates from the 1925-1929 period to estimate real interest rates in this period of a stable price level. Second, we use microeconomic and macroeconomic observations along with estimates of preference parameters to bound real interest rates. Both methods lead us to the conclusion that the real interest rate in August 1929 is below 6 percent. This implies that the fundamental value of U.S. corporations exceeds the value of those corporations' market equity.
A. Market Interest Rates
The relevant market interest rates were not high in 1929. It is true, as Rappaport and White (1993) have pointed out, that rates on brokerage loans were high in the period before the stock market crash of 1929. However, the high brokerage rates are easily explained in light of Federal Reserve policy.
In Figure 5 , we plot rates for 90-day brokers' time loans along with other key shortterm market interest rates. It is clear from the figure that brokers' loan rates were relatively high in 1928 and 1929. During 1928, the Federal Reserve adopted a tighter monetary stance because "intense activity of the securities markets and the unprecedented rise of security prices gave unmistakable evidence of an absorption of the country's credit in speculative security operations to an alarming extent" (Federal Reserve Board 1929, pp. 1-2). In the report, the Board notes that the measures taken in 1928 to stem growth in "speculation"
by selling open-market investments and by raising discount rates "had not proven adequate"
(Federal Reserve Board 1929, p. 2).
In February 1929, a letter was sent by the Board of Governors to regional Federal
Reserve banks stating that "a member bank is not within its reasonable claims for rediscount facilities at its Federal reserve bank when it borrows either for the purpose of making speculative loans or for the purpose of maintaining speculative loans" (Federal Reserve Board 1929, p. 3). The Fed was concerned that credit would not be available for nonfinancial business needs. Immediately following this action, loan rates rose dramatically.
Thus, the rise in brokers' loan rates and very short-term rates was the direct effect of Federal Reserve policy and does not indicate that the stock market was overvalued or that lenders perceived a bubble in the stock market as Rappaport and White (1993) have argued.
6 Since the Federal Reserve was following an explicit policy of constraining credit to investors in the stock market that they viewed as "speculators," it is not hard to rationalize temporarily high brokers' rates that exceed the return on productive assets.
If we consider other assets, we find rates below 6 percent during the period from 1925 through 1929, even when we take into account the small decline in the price level. In Figure 5 , we plot commercial paper rates and short-term bond yields. In Figure 6 , we plot intermediateand long-term bond yields. All are in nominal terms. For real rates we need to correct for expected inflation. According to Romer's (1989) As the figures show, rates on U.S. Treasury securities at all maturities were in the range of 4 percent and were not as affected by Federal Reserve policy as the brokerage loan rates. Commercial paper rates were in the range of 4 to 4.5 percent until the Federal Reserve increased discount rates significantly. At the peak of the market, these interest rates reached a little over 6 percent. But, as with brokerage loan rates, these rates were high only temporarily.
Since we are interested in rates for productive assets in the corporate sector, a more relevant market rate to consider is the corporate bond yield. Average nominal corporate bond yields were roughly constant over the entire 1925-1930 period, at a little over 5 percent. If we take into account inflation, the average yields were closer to 5.5 and at most 5.75 percent for a very short period. According to Banking and Monetary Statistics (Federal Reserve Board 1943), the basic nominal yields of corporate bonds at a maturity of two years is around 5 percent for 1929. For longer-term maturities, the yields fall off to 4.4 percent. In the very short term they are 5.6 percent.
If we use the maximum corporate yield of 5.75 percent as an upper bound on the real interest rate, we estimate a resource cost of intangible capital equal to 0.83 times GNP. If we account for taxes, this implies a fundamental value of intangible capital equal to 0.64 times GNP. Adding this to the value of tangible capital implies a total value of 1.78 times GNP, which is equal to 20 times corporate earnings.
B. Macro and Micro Evidence
There is strong indirect evidence that supports our view that the real interest rate was below 6 percent in 1929. In this section, we show that if preferences are stable over time, estimates of preference parameters -based on both macro and micro evidence -can be used to put a bound on the real interest rate.
We assume that households maximize discounted expected utility with the per-period utility function given by U (c, l) = c 1−σ v(l)/(1 − σ) and the discount factor given by β. Here, we are assuming that c is consumption and l is leisure. We choose these preferences because they are consistent with observations on growth. (See Lucas 1990.)
We first show that high values of σ and β are needed to account for a high real interest rate in 1929. Then, we report on estimates of σ based on both macroeconomic data and microeconomic data -all of which are too low to justify a high real rate of interest.
Our preferences imply the following relationship between the real interest rate and the real growth rate of per capita income if l is constant, as it nearly was:
where γ is equal to the growth rate of real GNP less the growth rate of the population. This relation is derived by setting the interest rate equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
In the postwar period, real interest rates have been around 4 percent with growth in per-capita consumption around 2 percent. Pairs of σ and β consistent with these facts must satisfy 1.04 = (1.02) σ /β. and time, the capital-output ratio would be very low. But we do not see sufficiently large differences in returns and capital-output ratios for σ to be much above 1.
In summary, we find no evidence of a high value for the real rate of interest -either from observations on market rates in 1929 or from postwar micro and macro data. And, as a result, we find no evidence of an overvalued stock market in 1929. Our calculations lead us to the opposite view -that it was undervalued. Thus, we agree with Irving Fisher's view that stock prices in October of 1929 were low.
We should note that at each step in our estimation, we tried to err on the conservative side. Our upper bound for the actual market valuation is 19 times corporate earnings, or 1.67
times GNP. Our lower bound for the fundamental valuation is 20 times corporate earnings, or 1.78 times GNP. A fundamental valuation any lower is not justified by observations on profits, capital stocks, tax rates, growth rates, and interest rates.
Conclusions
In February 1930, Irving Fisher published The Stock Market Crash -and After. In this book, he explained why he believed stock prices in the fall of 1929 were too low. Galbraith (1954, p. 146) , like many economic historians after him, viewed the crash as clear evidence that Fisher was wrong. According to Galbraith (1954) , Fisher's book attracted little attention because, as he put it, "one trouble with being wrong is that it robs the prophet of his audience when he most needs it to explain why."
This interpretation of events, however, incorrectly presumes that markets can be overvalued but not undervalued. In fact, many who have studied the stock market in the 1920s view the possible scenarios as twofold. The view is either (i) asset prices were too high relative to fundamentals or (ii) asset prices were justified vis-a-vis fundamentals. Few studies have tried to argue for or against Fisher's thesis that the stock market was undervalued.
In this paper, we examined the crash of 1929 with the aid of historical data and modern theory. We find that a conservative estimate for the market value of U.S. corporations is no greater than 19 times corporate earnings (or 1.67 times GNP). We find that a conservative estimate for the fundamental value of U.S. corporations is no smaller than 20 times corporate earnings (or 1.78 times GNP). This comparison suggests that Irving Fisher was right to say that stock prices were low in 1929, even at their peak. 
Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe sources for the data used in the figures and tables.
1. Figure 1 (a) After-tax corporate profits, prior to 1929: Table 1 .
(b) After-tax corporate profits, 1929 and later: www.bea.doc.gov/dn1.htm, NIPA Also used for Figure 3 and Table 3. 3. Figure 3 (a) Market Value of all U.S. Corporations: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States (Federal Reserve Board 1945 -2000 . Add market value of domestic corporations in Table L213 to the sum of net debt (= total liabilities − total financial assets + corporate equities held directly or in mutual funds) from Tables L102,   L109 , L114, L115, L118, L124, L126, L127, L130.
4. Figure 4 (a) Domestic tangible corporate capital: www.bea.doc.gov/dn1.htm, Fixed Assets Tables 7 and 9 . 5. Figure 5 (a) Short-term Interest rates: Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 3 ). Some data are missing because they are not in the public domain. Any missing figures appear in bold and are estimated to be proportional to "Total receipts less total deductions" with the factor of proportionality equal to the 1929 ratio.
8. Table 2 (a) Company list for S&P: Standard and Poor's (1990, p. 115) . Fisher (1930, Chart 11, p. 86) .
(e) Market Value, All corporations: Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) , www.econ.
nyu.edu/user/jovanovi.
10
. Table 4 (a) Tax rate on profits: ratio of 'Profits tax liability, NIPA' to 'Profits before taxes, NIPA' in Table 1 .
(b) Tax rate on dividends: weighted sum of surtax rate on net income across net income classes where the weights are dividend income for the class divided by total dividend income. (b) GNP deflator: Romer (1989) , Table 2 . This is equal to the ratio of the end-of-year market capitalization to 1929 earnings reported in the S&P Security Price Index Record (Standard and Poor's 1990).
Other Data cited in Text
4 Thus, any measure that we can get of the value of corporate equity in 1929 would overstate the total value of the corporations, equity plus debt.
5 The normal tax was not assessed on dividend income.
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